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Abstract
This paper examines whether information technology (IT) and decentralized
work organization are complementary only for large firms or also for smaller firms.
Empirical evidence, which suggests complementarity between IT and decentraliza-
tion, is mainly based on large firms. Using data from a sample of 3292 SMEs and
of 598 larger firms from the manufacturing and service sector in Germany, I can
observe firms’ IT intensity in terms of enterprise software and computer use and
whether firms have a decentralized work organization. I find that SMEs with de-
centralized work practices tend to use IT more intensively. Moreover, for the sample
of SMEs, IT and decentralized work organization are individually associated with
higher productivity but the combination of IT and decentralization does not yield
a productivity premium. Contrarily, for the sample of larger firms, the results show
that the productivity of IT depends positively on decentralization. The findings sug-
gest that combining IT and decentralized work organization seems to be a successful
strategy only for larger firms.
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1 Introduction
Information and communication technologies (ICT) have been important drivers of productivity
growth and innovation over the last 20 years.1 Moreover, empirical evidence has shown that ICT
productivity returns are not identical across firms and countries but they may vary depending
on different work organization and human resource practices (e.g. Bresnahan et al. (2002),
Bloom et al. (2012)). Thus, a key conclusion from this evidence is that effective use of ICT
should be accompanied with appropriate work organization. In particular, workplace practices
that allow for decentralized decision-making and reward individual effort have turned out to
improve the effective use of ICT. However, most of the empirical evidence is from large firms,
mainly due to data availability, and it remains an open question whether the findings on effective
implementation of ICT can be generalized for smaller firms. Generally, firms of different size may
differ in their ability to employ ICT or they may have made different levels of complementary
organizational investments (Tambe and Hitt (2012)).
This paper tests the hypothesis on the complementarity between IT and decentralized work
organization for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) and compares the results from the sample
of smaller firms to those from larger firms. The empirical analysis sheds light on the relationship
between IT use, decentralized work organization practices and productivity for firms of different
size. The data I use is a unique sample of 3292 SMEs and 598 larger firms from the manufacturing
and service sector in Germany. It is an unbalanced panel covering the years 2004, 2007 and
2010. For the empirical analysis of the relationship between IT and decentralization and their
productivity contributions, I proceed in two steps. First, I analyze by conditional correlation
regressions whether firms with decentralized work practices are more IT intensive. Second, I
examine the productivity impacts of these two factors by estimating a Cobb-Douglas production
function that is augmented by IT and work organization as additional inputs and that allows
for interaction effects between these two inputs.
My main measure for firms’ IT intensity is the firms’ usage intensity of enterprise software
systems. The considered enterprise software systems are enterprise resource planning (ERP),
supply chain management (SCM) and customer relationship management (CRM), which are
among the most widely diffused enterprise software systems. Such systems assist firms in col-
lecting, storing and using information in the value creation process. Therefore, they can be
viewed as good proxies to capture the improved information availability through modern IT.
Additionally, I take account of firms’ IT intensity by the share of employees using mainly com-
puters for work. Decentralized work organization is measured by the existence of a business
unit with own profit and loss responsibility. Moreover, firms’ use of performance pay is used as
another measure that reflects decentralization of work and responsibility. Performance pay also
indicates whether firms remunerate good performance.
1 See for a recent literature review, e.g. Draca et al. (2007), Bertschek (2012) and Cardona et al. (2013).
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To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first analysis on complementarity between IT and
decentralization that compares findings from smaller firms to larger firms. Even though Tambe
and Hitt (2012) compare IT returns between midsize and large firms, they cannot include work
organization in their productivity analysis due to data limitations. The comparison between
SMEs and larger firms allows examining whether findings from large firms are valid for firms of
smaller size, too. There might be reasons to expect the complementarity of IT and decentrali-
zation not to be present for small firms because of different IT usage ability and different levels
of IT-related complementary investments across firm size, such as skills or appropriate work
organization (Tambe and Hitt (2012), Giuri et al. (2008)). Small firms might on average have
lower demand for IT-related complements, for instance, due to a lower amount of information
that has to be processed and coordinated (Giuri et al. (2008)). Moreover, the paper contributes
to a better understanding of the role of IT, work organization and their interactions for explaining
productivity differences among firms of smaller size, given that there is few evidence on the
productivity contributions of combining these two factors for smaller firms.
My results show that in line with the complementarity hypothesis, SMEs with a decentralized
work organization and performance pay use IT more intensively. Large firms are only signifi-
cantly more IT intensive when using performance pay. Although both, IT and decentralization,
are individually associated with higher SME productivity, the results do not reveal robust evi-
dence for a productivity effect from combining IT and decentralization. Only the combination
of IT and performance pay is weakly associated with higher productivity for SMEs. In con-
trast, the results for large firms show a significant productivity effect for the combination of
IT and decentralization as it has already been found in prior research. The comparison of the
results for SMEs and larger firms suggests that only larger firms benefit from combining IT and
decentralized work organization.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I give an overview of the
key insights from the literature on IT productivity. The focus is on the complementary relation
between IT and organizational practices and on enterprise software systems. The third section
presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section four illustrates the empirical methods to
test for complementarity. Section five discusses the empirical results and conducts robustness
checks and section six concludes with suggestions for future research.
2 Literature and Background Discussion
ICT productivity returns have been shown to vary across countries and firms, which has been
summarized in the so-called "productivity puzzle" of ICT.2 One explanation for the measured
heterogeneity in the productivity contributions of ICT is seen in different levels of complementary
organizational investments, such as workplace organization and business process re-engineering
2 See for a short discussion about that argument, e.g. Bloom et al. (2010).
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across firms and countries. For instance, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) suggest that a possible
explanation why estimated IT output elasticities from firm-level studies have often been higher
than the IT contribution found with aggregate data from national accounts, might be due to
complementary organizational factors. Decentralized work organization is an example for such a
complementary factor, that is partly captured by the estimated IT coefficient if it is not explicitly
considered in the analysis. Several studies can incorporate work organization and highlight the
importance of decentralized work organization in order to derive the full potential of IT (e.g.
Bresnahan et al. (2002), Black and Lynch (2001) or Bloom et al. (2012)). This interdependence
between ICT and appropriate work practices and organization is summarized in the hypothesis
on complementarity between ICT and work organization.3
The theoretical framework for organizational complementarities is derived in the canonical paper
on production complementarities by Milgrom and Roberts (1990). They define that organiza-
tional factors are complements when there are nonconvexities with respect to the output function
in a firm’s decision whether to adopt any or all of a group of activities that complement new
technologies. The nonconvexities in the output function imply that the performance gain of
implementing (weakly) complementary organizational factors jointly is higher (or at least equal)
than the sum of the performance gains when the factors are implemented in isolation. Based
on this reasoning, two factors are also considered as complementary when firms rather adopt
the cluster of practices than the practices individually. In terms of factor demand, two factors
are complementary if a rise in demand for one factor also raises demand for the other factor.
Complementarities between organizational practices can explain differential productivity effects
between firms with different levels of those practices.
A complementary relationship between IT and a decentralized work organization can be theo-
retically underpinned by the difficulty to communicate specific knowledge and limits of people’s
information processing capacity. If knowledge that is valuable for firm performance is held by
employees but difficult to transmit, and information overload puts a constraint on the amount
of information that can be processed by decision-makers at the top of the hierarchy, then IT is
optimally associated with decentralized authority that gives decision rights to lower levels of the
hierarchy (Hitt and Brynjolfsson (1997)).
Generally, an organizational structure can be characterized as decentralized if not only the top
management has decision-making authority but also employees at lower levels of the hierarchy.4
The scope of decision authority may cover decisions about investment, recruiting, product in-
novations or pace of work. Thus, decentralization implies that decision-making is spread more
evenly throughout the firm in contrast to a centralized firm where decisions are only made at the
top of the organizational hierarchy. Decentralization of decision rights implies decentralization
3 See Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) for an overview of the theory behind organizational comple-
mentarities, a definition and empirical studies analyzing complementarities between IT and workplace
variables.
4 See e.g. Bloom et al. (2010) for an overview about the concept of decentralization in economics. The
following discussion about decentralization and its relationship to ICT is based on it.
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of information processing and especially large firms may implement it, given limited capacity of
individuals for information-processing and decision-making (Radner (1993)). Possible benefits of
decentralization are the reduction of information transfer and communication costs or increased
speed of reacting to market changes. Since modern IT reduce information access and processing
costs, they are seen as one determinant for decentralization. This mechanism of reduced infor-
mation costs causing firms to decentralize is theoretically formalized by Garicano (2000). In his
model, the firm is conceptualized as a cognitive hierarchy that has to solve problems of varying
difficulty and optimally decentralizes with decreasing information costs.
One of the first empirical studies on the relationship between IT and workplace organization
is by Bresnahan et al. (2002) who find that the productivity of IT in large US firms is higher
if firms also use workplace practices that allow for decentralized decision-making by teams and
employees. Moreover, they analyze the consequences of IT for the skill composition of labour
demand and show that firms using the combination of IT and decentralized work organization
tend to use more high-skilled labour, which makes them pointing towards the role of IT-enabled
organizational change. Black and Lynch (2001) show that US plant productivity is improved
the higher the share of nonmanagers using the computer and the higher the education level of
workers is. Tambe et al. (2012) find that the combination of IT, decentralization and external
focus, which captures a firm’s intensity to observe the market environment and availability to
uncover market opportunities, is associated with significantly higher productivity for moderate-
size and large US firms.
Recently, Bloom et al. (2013) point towards the differential impact of information versus com-
munication technology on the allocation of decision rights within the firm: They show that in-
formation technology, measured by ERP, increases worker and plant manager autonomy, making
them conclude that IT facilitates information access at lower levels of the hierarchy. Contrarily,
communication technology, measured by data networks, decreases decision autonomy at lower
levels of the hierarchy because decisions from employees can be more easily transferred to the top
of the hierarchy. Mahr and Kretschmer (2010) show that the corporate learning type determines
whether IT is more effective with greater decentralization or centralization: German manufac-
turers with an explorative learning type have higher IT productivity returns with greater degree
of decentralization, while IT and centralization turn out to be complementary for exploitative
learning type firms.
The complementarity relationship between IT and work methods has also been shown to explain
geographical variation in IT returns. Bloom et al. (2012) argue that the US advantage in IT-
related productivity effects in comparison to Europe, that has been observed from the mid-1990s,
can be attributed to differences in used work and human resource practices between the US and
Europe: They show that people management practices which foster individual target setting
and monitoring, promotions, rewards, hiring and firing are complementary to IT capital and
that US-owned firms employ such practices more intensively than European firms.
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Evidence on ICT productivity returns and organizational complementarities in SMEs is still
scare. Tambe and Hitt (2012) find on average higher long-run IT returns for large than for
midsize US firms, whereas the midsize firms materialize the gains from IT more quickly. They
argue this pattern of IT returns to be consistent with the hypothesis that small firms have
lower adjustment costs but large firms are better equipped to benefit from IT-related comple-
ments. Arvanitis (2005) finds for Swiss firms, mainly SMEs, no evidence for complementarity
between IT and decentralized workplace practices and that the productivity contribution of
flexible and decentralized workplace practices is lower than the contribution of ICT or human
capital. Bugamelli and Pagano (2004) argue that complementary investments in organizational
capital and human capital have acted as barriers to investment in ICT for Italian manufacturing
firms, among them mainly SMEs. Also for Italian, mainly SMEs from the manufacturing sector,
Giuri et al. (2008) find that productivity gains from combining IT and organizational change do
not seem to be present in small firms. They only find evidence for complementarities between
organizational change and skills. However, given differences in characteristics between small and
large firms related to complexity and flexibility of work routines, financial capabilities, amount
of information or skill composition that originate from the different size, the authors argue
that there might be reasons to believe that complementarities between IT and organizational
change are generally less present in SMEs: For instance, since large firms have to coordinate
more information, tasks and people, they will have greater demand for ICT and complementary
investments such as workplace reorganization and should also benefit more from implementing
the complementary system.
In empirical studies, ICT capital is often measured by investment in hardware, software and/or
telecommunication equipment, possibly used to construct an ICT capital stock variable, or by
the number of computers per employee available in the firm. A particular type of information
technology applications are enterprise software systems. Enterprise resource planning (ERP),
supply chain management (SCM) and customer relationship management (CRM) are three
widely employed enterprise software systems. These software systems have changed drastically
how firms can store, access, share, exchange and analyze information relevant for business op-
erations. In particular, these systems have increased the speed of information gathering and
availability and they feature an integrated database. Consequently, the improved information
basis should support firms in making more solid decisions and in particular, in reacting more
timely to problems and market trends. Moreover, enterprise systems also allow for transaction
automation, for instance of financial transactions within ERP systems.
While ERP is a general purpose software covering information from various business processes,
SCM and CRM software provide support for specific business processes of the value chain.5
Moreover, ERP is a software to organize information mainly from inside the firm, SCM and
CRM reach beyond internal firm boundaries. ERP system is the generic name for a large-scale
database that integrates data and information in real-time from any part of the business activity,
5 This paragraph is based on information about properties and benefits of enterprise software systems
stated in Hindricks et al. (2007), Bloom et al. (2013) and Engelstätter (2013).
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such as machine failures within the process of production, financial or marketing data or the data
from the human resource department, and stores this data centrally in a unified system. The
real-time accessibility of all kind of data allows managers to obtain an up-to-date overview of the
performance of the different business functions, which makes it possible to recognize problems
and market opportunities at an early stage. SCM and CRM are both software systems, which
are meant to support specific business processes. SCM software capabilities help organizing
the value chain and operations management in contact to suppliers or buyers. They provide
real-time planning capabilities with the aim to improve the efficiency of the value chain and to
react more quickly to demand and supply. CRM software provides tools to systemize customer
relationship management with the aim to improve customer satisfaction and customer loyalty.
While there is a large literature, generally from the Information Systems (IS) and business
studies literature, on qualitative assessments of enterprise software systems and case-study based
evidence, often for one specific enterprise software system, there are few econometric studies
that assess the performance effects of enterprise software systems using firm-level data from a
larger sample of firms. The existing evidence is mixed, although, pointing towards a positive
relationship between the use of some of the systems and performance. With data from Korean
SMEs, SCM use is significantly and positively associated with total factor productivity (TFP),
while ERP and CRM are not (Shin (2006)). German firms benefitted most from the systems
when they had adopted all three systems, ERP, SCM and CRM, together (Engelstätter (2013)).
US firms with positive performance gains from ERP adoption kept on investing in SCM and/or
CRM, which led to additional improvement gains (Aral et al. (2006)). There are only few studies
on complementarities between enterprise software systems as particular examples of IT and work
organization. López (2012) finds that CRM use and organizational change are complementary
in Spanish firms from the manufacturing and service sector, while no significant productivity
increase is found for the combination of ERP use with organizational change. Aral et al. (2012)
show that the combination of human resource practices, which monitor employees’ performance,
and performance pay complements special software for human capital management, which is
often part of an ERP system.
The purpose of this paper is to shed new light on the complementarity between IT and decen-
tralized work organization and on the productivity of these two factors in SMEs in comparison
to large firms. The next section presents the data set, which is followed by a discussion of the
empirical strategies to test for complementarity.
3 Data
The data used for the analysis comes from three waves of the ICT survey collected from the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) with which an unbalanced panel data set is
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constructed that includes information from the three years 2004, 2007 and 2010.6 The ICT
survey is a firm-level survey with the focus on the diffusion and the use of information and com-
munication technologies of firms from the manufacturing and service sector located in Germany
with a firm size starting with five employees. The survey has been until now conducted five
times, for the first time in 2000, then in 2002, 2004, 2007 and in 2010. For each wave roughly
4,400 firms were surveyed and the data is stratified according to industries, to three size classes
and to two regions (East/West Germany). The survey is constructed as an unbalanced panel.
Consequently, some firms were surveyed in each wave, others only in certain waves and others
only once. With respect to the topics and questions asked, some questions are repeated in each
wave, others were only asked in some of the waves. For the analysis in this paper, I use data
from the waves of 2004, 2007 and 2010 because from 2004 onwards information on enterprise
software use intensity and information on work organization is available. Hence, the time frame
of the data represents the diffusion of ICT after 2000, where at least basic ICT, such as the
personal computer, might be already more widely diffused among firms. Firms may also have
made different choices of complementary investments so that many combinations of IT and work
organization might exist. Due to item-non response of variables used in the empirical analy-
sis and an unbalanced panel structure, there are 3890 firms in my estimation sample and an
overall number of observations of 5260 is obtained.7 Thus, the majority of firms in the sample
participated only once in the survey.
Since I want to compare results from smaller firms to those from larger firms, I divide the
estimation sample according to employment size. Based on international classifications8, the
maximum employment level for a firm to be an SME is not more than 250. Therefore, I classify
all firms with at most 250 employees as SMEs. Those firms with exactly 250 employees are
included because the descriptive statistics indicate that a large number of firms declare to have
250 employees, which in a telephone-based survey might be said by the interviewee if she does
not know the exact number but expects 250 employees as a decent guess.9 Based on this
classification, 3292 firms are classified as SMEs with an overall number of 4493 observations.
Thus, on average 80 percent of the surveyed firms belong to the category of SMEs. Table
12 in the appendix shows the sector composition of the estimation sample in comparison to
the totally available data of firms with at most 250 employees. Since the distribution of the
estimation sample is not significantly different from the complete data set, it can be assumed
that the used sample is representative with respect to the industries. The remaining 598 firms
are classified as large firms with totally 767 observations. The industry composition of this
sample is similar to the composition of the totally available data for large firms, too (Table 13
6 The data is accessible at the ZEW Research Data Centre: http://kooperationen.zew.de/en/zew-
fdz/home.html
7 This sample is based on a data set that excludes productivity outliers keeping only firms within the
first and 99th percentile of the labour productivity distribution. Labour productivity is measured by
total sales over the number of employees. In total, 51 observations are dropped.
8 See e.g. the definition of SMEs by the European Commission:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/facts-figures-analysis/sme-definition/
9 The empirical results presented in section 5 do not change qualitatively when firms with exactly 250
employees are considered in the sample of large firms.
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in the appendix). As the focus of the empirical analysis is on SMEs, the following descriptive
statistics refer only to them. Descriptive Statistics for large firms can be found in the appendix
(Table 14 to 17).
Enterprise software use as a particular type of IT and work organization are the main variables
I use in order to test for complementarity between IT and decentralized work organization. The
section on enterprise software systems in the survey covers whether firms use an ERP, a SCM
or a CRM software asking the firms for no (0), minor (1) or broad (2) use. The question on
ERP use was already asked in the 2000 wave, while the questions on SCM and CRM were
asked in this form for the first time in 2004. Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for
the software use intensity and correlations between them. Among the three software systems,
ERP is the most intensively used system. This order is plausible because ERP is the most
general software among the three systems. Regarding only the average use of the three software
systems (not reported in Table 1), i.e. without distinguishing between usage intensity, across all
years 62 percent of the firms in the SMEs sample use ERP, followed by 43 percent using CRM
and 35 percent using SCM. For the sample of large firms, almost all firms use ERP (mean =
93.20 percent), and also SCM (mean = 72.40 percent) and CRM (mean = 71.70 percent) are
widely diffused. Heterogeneity across large firms is present in the usage intensity (Table 14 in
the appendix). The mean usage intensity by large firms is slightly higher for all three software
systems in comparison to the small firms. However, at least for SCM and CRM the variation
in usage intensity according to the standard deviation is fairly similar for firms of both size
categories.
Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Enterprise Software Use for SMEs
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. ERP SCM CRM
ERP 1.03 0.88 0 2 1
SCM 0.50 0.74 0 2 0.33 1
CRM 0.60 0.77 0 2 0.28 0.36 1
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N = 4493.
To measure a firm’s IT intensity, I construct an IT intensity indicator based on the usage inten-
sity of these three enterprise software systems. I standardize each factor individually through
z-scoring and then I sum up the standardized factors and standardize this sum again. The
standardization S is obtained by subtracting the mean µx of the respective variable x within
the overall sample and by dividing by the sample standard deviation SDx of the variable. The
following equation summarizes the construction of the IT intensity indicator:
IT = S(S(ERP ) + S(SCM) + S(CRM))
S ∼= x−µxSDx
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I add the standardized individual software values into an aggregate IT indicator, which implies
that each factor gets equal weight in the indicator, because the hypothesis for equality of coef-
ficients among the three standardized software values could not be rejected after a productivity
regression when the standardized values are entered into the regression individually.10 This
standardization yields that the mean of the standardized variables is zero and the standard
deviation is one. It provides for each firm a normalized measure of enterprise software systems
usage intensity that relates the individual firm’s software intensity to the overall sample mean
value and its dispersion. Firms with identical enterprise software use intensity for all three sys-
tems have the same value with respect to this indicator and higher values reflect that firms use
more of the three considered systems and indicate to use the systems more intensively.
Regarding the interpretation of the indicator, this IT measure provides a picture of the intensity
of a firm’s reliance on information for decision-making and for business process organization.
Since enterprise software systems facilitate to gather, collect and analyze information, they sup-
port in making decisions about product characteristics or strategic considerations as well as in
organizing business processes more efficiently. Thus, this IT indicator captures the improved in-
formation availability enabled through IT, which is also part of the theoretical arguments behind
the complementarity hypothesis between IT and work organization: Improved information use
combined with work organization that allows decentralized decision-making and sets incentives
for good performance should be particularly beneficial for firms because information can be used
timely to recognize problems and trends. For instance, the information can be used to develop
new products or services, which might increase productivity. Moreover, IT allows observing
performance more easily. Although this IT indicator captures explicitly only a specific part of
the firm’s IT use since it only considers enterprise software use, the advantage of its narrow
scope is its economic interpretation as proxy for a firm’s intensity of technology-supported use
of information as an input into the production process. Even if this IT measure based on the
enterprise software systems mismeasures a firm’s IT intensity as well as the extent of the use
of information in business processes, the measurement error is likely to downward bias the es-
timates for this indicator.11 Moreover, firms with higher values of this indicator will likely also
have a higher overall IT capital stock including hardware, all kind of software and telecommuni-
cation equipment, which will be needed to make the enterprise software systems work effectively.
Therefore, this indicator can be interpreted as a proxy for firms aggregate IT intensity, too.
Nonetheless, it still might be that firms with low enterprise software use intensity are IT intensive
(Type II error) when they use other types of IT intensively, such as the personal computer
(PC). Since the data includes information on a firm’s share of employees working mainly at
the computer, I use it as an additional measure for a firm’s overall IT intensity. The share
of employees working mainly with the PC can be interpreted as a measure for IT capital or
alternatively for labour heterogeneity (Bertschek and Meyer (2009)). This IT measure captures
10The test for equality of coefficients is based on coefficient estimates from the regression specification in
Table 8, column (2).
11See Tambe et al. (2012) for a similar argument for their measure of external focus, p. 847.
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part of a firm’s hardware and software equipment as well as the extent of the firm’s dependence
on the computer as a working tool within its business model.
I measure decentralized work organization by the existence of a business unit with own profit
and loss responsibility (BU), such as a profit centre. A similar measure for decentralization is
used by Acemoglu et al. (2007) who define a firm as decentralized when its business units are
organized as profit centres.12 This measure of decentralization refers particularly to the extent
of decision autonomy and responsibility at the manager level below the central management
board. Moreover, I include the information whether a firm offers performance pay (PP) to its
employees as a further measure for decentralized work practices. This measure reflects the firm’s
use of incentive-setting to reward good performance.13
Since the information on both work organization variables is binary, I incorporate them as
dummy variables into the regression. In robustness checks, I also compute a count variable
that adds the two variables into one measure for decentralization. The organizational practices
variables were not asked in the wave of the 2007 survey. In order to not loose information on
software use and firm performance from 2007, I replace the organizational practices variables
in 2007 with the information of 2010. When this information is not available, due to item
non-response or the unbalanced panel structure, I replace the 2007 values with information
from 2004. This replacement strategy relies on the assumption of organizational factors being
quasi-fixed in the short-run, which is usually made in empirical analyses on the effects of organi-
zational practices when only cross-sectional information on those practices is available (see, e.g.
Bresnahan et al. (2002) or Bloom et al. (2012)). The work organization variables I use are close
to time-invariant in the sample of SMEs as it is indicated by transition probabilities and persis-
tence statistics for those firms with multiple participation in the survey (not reported; available
upon request). Thus, the assumption of the work organization practices being quasi-fixed in the
period of analysis can be supported by the data. This assumption holds also for large firms.
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the two work organization variables. Across all years, 52
percent of the firms use performance pay, and 28 percent of them have a business unit with own
profit and loss responsibility. As for the enterprise software use intensity, the average use of the
two work practices is higher in the sample of large firms with 70 percent having a business unit
with own profit and loss responsibility and even 85 percent of the firms using performance pay
(Table 15 in the appendix).
12Acemoglu et al. (2007) provide a description of the decision authority that managers of business units,
which are organized as profit centres, have. In particular, managers of profit centres have the responsi-
bility to monitor revenues and costs. See p. 1773ff.
13Recent research shows empirical evidence for complementarity of decentralization, measured in terms
of the delegation of decision rights from principals to middle management, with performance pay (e.g.
Hong et al. (2014)). In this paper, I do not account for a possible complementarity between decentral-
ization and performance pay.
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Table 2: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Work Organization Variables
for SMEs
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Business Unit Performance Pay
Business Unit 0.28 0.45 0 1 1
Performance Pay 0.52 0.50 0 1 0.22 1
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N = 4493.
Like the IT indicator measures only part of a firm’s IT use, the variables to measure decentralized
work organization capture only a small part of a firm’s work organization. Thus, they might
mismeasure firms’ decentralization degree and if so, the estimates are downward biased. The
mismeasurement problem refers in particular to the intensity of the use of the considered work
practices, given that the information on work practices I have is only binary and I do not know
how many employees within the firm, for instance, are affected by performance pay or what
the scope of decision autonomy is that employees have. Nevertheless, firms which use these
work practices might on average probably be more likely to also use other work practices that
allow decentralized decision-making and reward performance. In the robustness checks, I also
incorporate a dummy variable equal to one when the firm makes use of self-responsible team
work. This information serves as another measure for decentralized work that reflects delegation
of decision autonomy to employees and not only to managers.
Table 3: Production Function Variables for SMEs
variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Number of Employees 52.44 57.16 28 5 250
Capital Stock 183 8 920 3 0.006 584 000
Total Sales 10.60 26.10 3.40 0.06 650
Value Added (deflated) 3.39 7.83 1.15 0.02 152
% Firms located in former East Germany 0.33 0.47 0 0 1
% Multi-Plant Group 0.28 0.45 0 0 1
Labour Productivity (Sales per Employee) 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.008 5.59
Value Added per Employee (deflated) 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.001 2.73
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N = 4493.
The values of gross investment, sales, value added and the respective per capita values are
expressed in million Euros. Deflated Values are in prices of 2005.
Table 4: Logarithmic Production Function Variables for SMEs
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
log(Employment) 3.40 1.08 1.61 5.52
log(Capital Stock) 14.95 1.79 8.71 27.09
log(Value Added) 14.03 1.40 10.05 18.84
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010.
N = 4493.
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Besides information on ICT, the ICT survey covers information on general firm characteristics,
such as total sales, investment or human capital composition of the workforce. Table 3 to Table
5 provide descriptive statistics of further variables used in the empirical analysis. I capture
firm performance through deflated value added. Since I do not have exact information, neither
on firms’ materials and intermediate inputs nor on firm-specific prices, I use industry-wide
information on gross value added together with information on the price evolution from the
German National Statistics Agency (Destatis) and combine it with firms’ reported total sales
from the survey to obtain a proxy for real value added. Labour input is measured by the number
of employees and capital input is obtained by constructing a capital stock from the available
gross investment data. In the appendix, I explain in detail the construction of my measures for
value added and for the capital stock (see A.2 and A.3, respectively). Moreover, I use as control
variables information on the share of high-skilled employees (degree from university, university
of applied sciences or university of cooperative education), export status, presence of a works
council and whether a change in management happened in the year before the survey period.
Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations for further Firm Characteristics for SMEs
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% Emp. Working with PC 0.45 0.34 0 1
% High-Skilled Employees 0.21 0.26 0 1
% Share Exporters 0.51 0.50 0 1
% Works Council 0.23 0.42 0 1
% Change in Management 0.18 0.39 0 1
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N =4493.
4 Empirical Methods
In order to test for complementarity between IT and decentralized work organization, I conduct
correlation and productivity analyses. These are the two most widely used empirical methods to
study organizational complementarities.14 These two methods complement each other because
each test has the highest statistical power if the other is weakest (Brynjolfsson and Milgrom
(2013)). For the correlation analysis and the productivity analysis, I apply pooled ordinary
least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors clustered across firms to account for multiple
participation in the survey. Thus, I exploit variation across firms to obtain my coefficient
estimates.
14Athey and Stern (1998) are among the first to discuss an empirical framework to measure organizational
complementarities empirically. See Brynjolfsson and Milgrom (2013) for a survey on the theory and
econometrics of studying complementarities in organizations.
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4.1 Correlation Analysis
As it has been done in prior work (e.g. Bloom et al. (2012) and Tambe et al. (2012)), I
run a conditional correlation analysis between IT (IT ) and the two measures for decentralized
work organization (BU and PP ) to study whether firms with self-responsible business units or
performance pay are also more IT intensive. I use the following regression specification:
ITit = γBUBUit + ωPPPPit + δlln(firmsizeit) + λ′Xit + uit
where i stands for the individual firm and t for the time period.
In the most basic regression specification, I control for firm size through the logarithm of the
number of employees ln(firmsize), for multi-establishment group, for region through a dummy
variable if located in East Germany and for a full set of time-interacted industry fixed effects
included in the control vector X.15
In further regression specifications, the control vector includes also the share of high-skilled
employees, the share of employees working mainly with the computer, whether the firm exports,
existence of a works council or whether the firm experienced a change in management within the
period of analysis. All additional control variables serve to rule out alternative explanations for
the results of the relationship between IT and work organization. I control for the share of high-
skilled employees to take account of the firm’s human capital composition since it has been shown
that IT and high-skilled human capital are complementary and are an important factor to explain
heterogeneity in IT returns (see, e.g. Draca et al. (2007) for a survey). Furthermore, it has been
shown that IT-intensive firms with decentralized work organization employ more high-skilled
workers (Bresnahan et al. (2002)). The computer work share is an alternative measure to the
enterprise software indicator for firms’ overall IT intensity. It will likely be positively correlated
with decentralized work practices if more IT-intensive firms also adopt more decentralized work
methods. Moreover, firms with a higher share of employees working mainly at the computer are
likely to use enterprise software systems more intensively, too. Additionally, the computer work
share can be regarded as measure for labour heterogeneity (Bertschek and Meyer (2009)).
Firm’s exporting activities account for the impact of international activities and exposure to
foreign competition. Exporting firms have shown to be more technology intensive and more pro-
ductive than non-exporters (see, e.g. Bernard et al. (2012), Bertschek et al. (2014)). Moreover,
increased foreign import competition has been found to be associated with more decentralization
15This regression specification does not suggest the direction of causality between IT and decentralization
in light of the view in the literature that IT facilitates and thus causes decentralization. Given the
properties of my data, I follow Bresnahan et al. (2002) who estimate firms’ short-run demand equations
for IT as a function of work organization and human capital. They justify this specification by arguing
that IT is the more easily variable factor within the complementary system than the relatively fixed
factors of work organization and human capital and that the correlation coefficients provide evidence
about complementarities.
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and performance-based pay in US firms (Guadelupe and Wulf (2008)). A works council can be
seen as a measure for employees’ voice in decision-making and a change in management might
have led to higher IT and/or decentralization intensity.
Even though correlations are neither necessary nor sufficient evidence of complementarities
(Athey and Stern (1998)), significant and positive γBU and ωPP coefficients can be interpreted
as support for complementarity between IT measured by enterprise software systems and de-
centralized work organization because they reflect that work practices allowing for decentralized
decision-making and individual authority are associated with more intensive use of enterprise
software systems. The correlation analysis can also be interpreted as a factor demand equation
where higher IT demand leads to higher demand for decentralization if the two factors are com-
plementary. The conditional correlation results reflect empirical relationships between IT and
decentralized work organization. They should not be interpreted as causal because the data
does not contain information neither on the date of the enterprise software adoption nor on the
timing of the implementation of decentralized work organization.
4.2 Productivity Analysis
The productivity analysis is based on a production function analysis that accounts explicitly
for IT and work organization as inputs into production and for possible interactions between
these two factors. As it is widely used in the IT productivity literature16 and in work on the
complementarity relation between IT and organization (e.g. Bresnahan et al. (2002), Bloom
et al. (2012)), I employ a Cobb-Douglas specification that is augmented for IT (IT ) and de-
centralized work organization (WO = {BU,PP}). The following regression equation formalizes
the empirical model:
yit = αc + αllit + αkkit + αIT ITit + αWOj
∑
j
WOjit + αIT∗WOj
∑
j
ITit ∗WOjit + λ′Xit + uit
where j  {BU,PP}, i stands for the individual firm and t for the time period. The dependent
variable y is logarithmized real value added. A firm’s capital stock is represented by k and labour
by l, both inputs are in logarithmic values. αc represents the constant and u an idiosyncratic
error term, which captures all unobserved factors. The regression specification features that IT
(IT ), work organization (WO) and their interaction terms (IT ∗WOj) are allowed to shift a
firm’s production frontier, i.e. they are modeled as part of the multi-factor productivity. Hence,
if they are productivity-increasing, they make the use of capital and labour more productive.
Both, IT and the work organization variables, are entered in levels individually as well as their
interaction. A positive and significant interaction term αIT∗WOj can be interpreted as support
for complementarity between IT and work organization. It reflects whether the IT productivity
contribution depends on work organization and thus whether these factors are interrelated with
16See for a summary of the econometric framework of IT productivity returns, e.g. Cardona et al. (2013).
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respect to productivity. The coefficient estimates for labour and capital are output elasticities
and for IT and WO they represent semi-elasticities.
Overall, the control variables are the same as in the correlation analysis. All control variables aim
at reducing endogeneity concerns due to omitted variables by capturing organizational factors
that will likely be relevant for observed firm heterogeneity in IT use, work organization and value
added. With respect to the interpretation of the control variables, in the productivity equation,
the computer work share, as another measure for a firm’s IT intensity than the measure based
on enterprise software, accounts also for the possibility that the enterprise software variables
do not merely capture the productivity effect of computer work if firms with higher enterprise
software use also have higher shares of employees working mainly with the computer.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Correlation Analysis for SMEs
Table 6 shows correlations between the IT indicator and the work organization variables. Col-
umn (1) presents a baseline estimate for the intensity of the correlation between IT and the
existence of a self-responsible business unit controlling only for firm size, regional location,
multi-establishment group and industry-interacted year fixed effects. The coefficient estimate
of this measure for decentralized work organization is highly significant indicating that firms
with a self-responsible business unit use enterprise software systems more intensively. This
result remains robust controlling for additional factors of firm heterogeneity (column (2) and
(3)). Among the control variables, the share of employees working predominantly with the PC
and exporting increases a firm’s IT intensity statistically significantly. It might seem surprising
that the share of high-skilled employees is not significantly positively related to IT intensity,
given prior findings on complementarity between IT and high-skilled human capital. This result
is mainly due to the high pairwise correlation between this share and the share of employees
working mainly at the PC (0.62***). In a regression without the computer work share, the
IT intensity as measured by the software indicator and the share of high-skilled employees are
significantly and positively correlated (column (8)). These findings reflect that the computer
work share captures a significant fraction of a firm’s skill intensity.
Columns (4) to (6) show conditional correlations between IT intensity and performance pay.
Firms using performance pay are also more IT intensive. The correlation coefficient of per-
formance pay to IT is smaller in size with 0.188 (column (6)) than the correlation coefficient
between IT and the existence of a self-responsible business unit with 0.329 (column (3)). This
relationship remains valid in a correlation analysis between IT and these two work organization
measures together (column (7)).
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Table 6: Correlations between Enterprise Software Intensity and Work Organization for SMEs
All Industries, Dependent Variable: Enterprise Software - IT Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Self-Responsible Business Unit (BU) 0.379∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.037)
Performance Pay (PP) 0.223∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
log(Employment) 0.267∗∗∗ 0.277∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
% Emp. Working with PC 0.667∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.700∗∗∗ 0.673∗∗∗ 0.630∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
% High-Skilled Emp. -0.024 -0.057 -0.015 -0.047 -0.078 0.235∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085) (0.080)
Exporting 0.201∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Works Council 0.046 0.051 0.044 0.043
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Change in Management -0.002 -0.002 -0.005 0.011
(0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Constant -1.222∗∗∗ -1.433∗∗∗ -1.440∗∗∗ -1.325∗∗∗ -1.535∗∗∗ -1.536∗∗∗ -1.452∗∗∗ -1.276∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.088) (0.090) (0.091) (0.087) (0.089) (0.089) (0.091)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493
Number of Firms 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292
R2 0.2024 0.2293 0.2364 0.1886 0.2188 0.2259 0.2417 0.2208
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Control variables include industry dummy variables based on two-digit classification
interacted with a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy variable for location equal to one if the firm is in one new German Bundesland (member
state), i.e. formerly East Germany, and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a multi-plant group. Robust standard errors clustered at the
firm level in parentheses.
Overall, the correlation analysis provides evidence that firms with work practices that allow de-
centralized decision-making and emphasize individual incentives tend to use enterprise software
more intensively. Therefore, in line with the hypothesis on the complementarity between IT and
decentralization, it holds for SMEs that firms with higher IT intensity are more likely to have
also adopted a decentralized work organization. However, it cannot be completely ruled out that
unobserved factors, such as management ability, bias the estimates or are the true driving force
behind the results, even though I control for a large amount of relevant unobserved heterogene-
ity. Moreover, the values on the R-Squared of the correlation regressions are only all around
0.20 to 0.25. These rather low values indicate that only a small fraction of the variation in en-
terprise software use intensity is explained by work organization and the other considered firm
characteristics. In the next section, I examine with productivity analyses whether combining IT
and decentralized work organization leads to improved performance.
5.2 Productivity Analysis for SMEs
Table 7 shows the results from different specifications of the productivity regressions to analyze
the productivity of IT and decentralized work organization and whether these organizational
factors are complementary according to the productivity analysis. Column (1) provides base-
line estimates for a standard Cobb-Douglas production function with labour and capital inputs.
The coefficients for labour and capital are statistically significant and plausible in magnitude.
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Column (2) introduces a baseline estimate for the average productivity contribution of IT mea-
sured by enterprise software usage intensity for the time periods 2004, 2007 and 2010. The
point estimate is about 0.096 and highly significant reflecting that firms with more intense
enterprise software use are more productive. Column (3) controls for the share of employees
working mainly at the PC as additional measure for a firm’s IT intensity. The coefficient of the
enterprise software indicator decreases slightly in size to 0.062 but remains highly significant.
This significantly positive coefficient supports the hypothesis that firms with higher intensity of
technology-supported use of information within the value creation process are more productive.
As found in prior analysis (e.g. Bertschek and Meyer (2009)), the estimate for the share of
employees working mainly at the computer is significantly positive, too. This result indicates
that higher computer work shares are linked with higher productivity levels. Altogether, firms
with higher IT intensity, either through enterprise software use or employees working mainly
with the computer, turn out to be the more productive ones.
Table 7: Productivity Regressions of IT and Work Organization for SMEs
All Industries, Dependent Variable: log(Value Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
IT - Index(ERP+CRM+SCM) 0.096∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.030 0.031 0.026 0.049∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013)
Self-Responsible Business Unit (BU) 0.153∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029)
Performance Pay (PP) 0.095∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
IT * BU -0.027 -0.028 -0.024 -0.024
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
IT * PP 0.041∗ 0.041∗ 0.038 0.037
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
log(Employment) 0.914∗∗∗ 0.891∗∗∗ 0.911∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.839∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
log(Capital Stock) 0.125∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
% Emp. Working with PC 0.621∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.555∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062)
% High-Skilled Emp. 0.132 0.105 0.368∗∗∗ 0.104
(0.083) (0.084) (0.079) (0.084)
Exporting 0.125∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Works Council 0.121∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Change in Management 0.038 0.051 0.040
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Constant 9.069∗∗∗ 9.270∗∗∗ 9.092∗∗∗ 9.138∗∗∗ 9.141∗∗∗ 9.147∗∗∗ 9.236∗∗∗ 9.388∗∗∗ 9.234∗∗∗
(0.148) (0.150) (0.146) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.148) (0.145)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493 4493
Number of Firms 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292 3292
R2 0.7256 0.7293 0.7412 0.7445 0.7446 0.7448 0.7471 0.7395 0.7470
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Control variables include industry dummy variables based on two-digit classification interacted
with a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy variable for location equal to one if the firm is in one new German Bundesland (member state), i.e.
formerly East Germany, and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a multi-plant group. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in
parentheses.
In column (4), the work organization measures for the existence of a self-responsible business
unit and the use of performance pay are added to the empirical specification. They both have
a significantly positive coefficient with a large magnitude. Having a self-responsible business
unit is associated with approximately 15.3 percent higher productivity (coefficient: 0.153) and
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using performance pay with roughly 9.5 percent higher productivity (coefficient: 0.095).17 These
coefficients, although not completely equivalent, are similar to prior coefficient estimates on de-
centralization or performance pay (e.g. Tambe et al. (2012) or Aral et al. (2012), respectively).
These results underline the view that decentralization and high-performance work practices mat-
ter for productivity.18 The inclusion of the work organization variables decreases the estimates
of the software and computer work intensity measures slightly but leaves them significant. This
reduction in the magnitude of the IT coefficients, when work organization is taken into account
in the productivity analysis, is consistent with the results from the correlation analysis that more
IT-intensive firms tend to have a decentralized work organization structure, too. Thus, when
omitting work organization in the regression specification, IT captures part of its productivity
contribution.
In column (5), I include pairwise interactions between enterprise software use and self-responsible
business unit, and enterprise software and performance pay in order to test for complementarity.
The inclusion of the interaction terms turns the coefficient on enterprise software insignificant,
whereas both coefficients for decentralized work organization remain positively significant. This
suggests that the return to enterprise software depends on work organization. A higher com-
puter work intensity remains positively related to productivity. The coefficient of the interaction
between IT and self-responsible business unit is, surprisingly, negative, even though not signifi-
cant. In contrast, the interaction term between IT and performance pay is positive and weakly
significant as column (5) shows.
Controlling also for the share of high-skilled employees to account for skilled human capital
(column (6)) does not change the previous results. Specification (7) takes account of additional
factors of firm heterogeneity which might drive the results by incorporating exporting activity,
the existence of a works council and whether a change in management took place in the survey
period . The consideration of these additional control variables lowers the individual coefficients
on work organization only slightly but leaves them highly significant. This result provides
confidence that the work organization variables do not pick up effects of alternative factors that
are also positively related to productivity. However, the combination of performance pay and
enterprise software use turns insignificant. The coefficient estimates on exporting and on works
council are significantly positive, which is in line with prior findings for a positive relationship
between productivity and export activities or a works council.
In specification (8), the share of computer employees is omitted to see how the coefficients evolve,
given that this measure reflects IT intensity and also partly labour heterogeneity. The coefficients
on enterprise software intensity and the share of high-skilled employees increase in size and both
become significant. This illustrates that computer work intensity captures a large part of a firm’s
IT intensity and also skill intensity as found already in the correlation analysis. Specification (9)
17The coefficients for these two work organization measures are similar in separate regressions where only
one measure is considered; results are not reported, available upon request.
18See for an empirical analysis of productivity impacts of workplace innovation, e.g. Black and Lynch
(2004) for US firms.
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excludes the interaction terms between IT and work organization to see what are the productivity
contributions without accounting for combination effects. The coefficient estimates are similar
to those in column (4) or (8). Overall, these results show that more IT-intensive firms and
firms with decentralized work structure and practices are more productive. However, there is no
robust evidence of complementarity between IT and decentralized work organization and only
weak support for a complementary relationship between IT and performance pay.
5.3 Discussion of the Results
There are several possible explanations why the interaction term between IT and decentralized
work organization is not significantly positive in contrast to prior empirical work based on
samples of mainly large firms. First, it might be that for smaller firms synergies from combining
IT and decentralization are not that strong in comparison to larger firms. The smaller the firm
size is, firms usually face less information and can act in more flexible ways so that they need less
standardized work routines and possibly benefit less from decentralization (Giuri et al. (2008)).
The incremental gain from combining IT with decentralized work organization might be smaller
for SMEs than for larger firms, for instance, because of a smaller market share and a smaller sales
volume. An alternative explanation could be that employees in SMEs can specialize less in their
tasks than employees in large firms because of the smaller workforce. Even if SMEs decentralize
formally, e.g. by having self-responsible business units, employees might still have to do multi-
tasking. Consequently, in light of constraints on human information processing capabilities,
they might benefit less from an improved information basis enabled by IT. Generally, firms of
different size might have different abilities to use IT most effectively and empirical evidence has
shown that small firms derive smaller marginal products from IT investments than large firms,
which is consistent with the hypothesis that large firms are better equipped to benefit from
IT-related complementary investments (Tambe and Hitt (2012)).
Another possibility for an insignificant interaction term might be that the indicators used in
the empirical analysis to measure IT intensity and decentralization suffer from measurement
error and capture only specific channels of the economic effects of IT and decentralization.19
Particularly, the variables for decentralized work organization are only binary variables. There-
fore, they do not capture any intensive margin of decentralization as broader decentralization
indicators that are used in prior work with other data sets do. If measurement error is present,
the estimates are downward biased. Although this possibility cannot be completely ruled out,
the positive and significant output elasticity coefficient estimates for IT and decentralized work
organization in isolation, even when controlling for other relevant sources of firm heterogeneity,
provide credibility that the measures capture at least to some extent firms’ IT and decentrali-
zation intensity.
19See Section 3 for a discussion of the economic interpretation of the IT and decentralization indicator.
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A third possibility why IT combined with decentralization is not significantly related to pro-
ductivity might be that the benefits of this combination depend on other firm characteristics.
These factors are possibly intangibles, given that prior research has demonstrated the role of
the corporate learning type (Mahr and Kretschmer (2010)) or external focus (Tambe et al.
(2012)) for the productivity effects of IT and decentralization, and of human resource analytics
for the effects of IT and performance pay (Aral et al. (2012)). Finally, Tambe et al. (2012)
find an insignificant interaction term between IT and decentralization, while their coefficients
on IT and decentralization are individually significant. They argue that it might be that most
IT-intensive firms have adopted decentralized work practices in recent years so that there are
minimal marginal effects on productivity from this combination. This argument might be valid
for SMEs, too, given that the time period of the data starting in 2004 is fairly recent and can
be seen as rather late for IT equipment adoption, such as enterprise software. However, given
that only 28 percent of the SMEs in the sample have an own business unit in contrast to 70
percent in the large firms sample, this argument might be less valid for the sample of SMEs I
use for the empirical analysis. Contrarily, one reason for not finding a synergy effect from IT
combined with decentralization could be that the SMEs might not have realized gains from the
combination yet because a successful implementation of process innovations may take time.
Given the nature of the data and the econometric techniques I can apply, there are some limi-
tations to the interpretation of the results. I can control for a large part of alternative firm
heterogeneity that is likely to be relevant for higher levels of IT and decentralized work organi-
zation as well as higher productivity levels. This allows me to rule out alternative explanations
for the positive association between IT, decentralization and productivity and to reduce en-
dogeneity concerns due to omitted variable bias. One potential source of remaining relevant
firm heterogeneity are unobserved individual firm fixed effects that capture quasi-fixed orga-
nizational factors such as management ability. However, part of the individual time-invariant
firm heterogeneity is captured already by taking explicitly account of workplace organization.
Under the additional assumption that the considered work organization practices are positively
correlated with management ability, the measures for work organization can be seen as a proxy
for management ability so that the bias from omitted management ability will be alleviated.
A direct method in a panel data analysis to check the impact of omitted variable bias on the
coefficient estimates of the explanatory variables due to firm fixed effects would be to control for
them using fixed effects estimation. The fixed effects estimator is valid under the assumption that
the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables. This assumption is
likely to be the case in my analysis, in particular for IT and decentralization as my main variables
of interest. A property of the fixed effects estimator is that it does not provide estimates for fully
time-invariant variables and only very imprecise estimates for rather stable variables (Cameron
and Trivedi (2009)). Since the IT and organizational variables are close to time-invariant within
the sample period for an individual firm with multiple participation and the majority of firms in
my sample is only surveyed once, the fixed effects estimator does not seem to be an appropriate
estimator for the available data. In general, fixed effects estimated IT coefficients have turned out
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to be lower than estimates from pooled OLS, which do not consider individual time-invariant
firm heterogeneity. One reason for this is that the fixed effects estimator eliminates any IT
benefits that are persistent over time at the firm level (Cardona et al. (2013)).
Another source for biased coefficient results might be endogeneity due to simultaneity. If firms
with a positive productivity shock adjust their IT levels correspondingly or if more productive
firms are more likely to adopt IT and decentralized work organization, the coefficient on IT and
work organization will be upward biased. This is particularly likely for the enterprise software
coefficient in light of results by Aral et al. (2006) who find that firms with successful ERP
adoption keep on adopting SCM and/or CRM. Generally, without explicit knowledge about firm
performance at the time of IT adoption or implementation of decentralized work practices or
without a meaningful variable that provides exogenous variation for differences in IT intensity
and decentralization that could be used for an instrumental variable analysis, making causal
interpretations about the impact of IT or work organization on productivity is problematic.
Since the data set including all considered variables is not rich enough to apply panel data
techniques that allow to control for simultaneity such as the Arellano and Bond System-GMM
or the Olley and Pakes estimator, the results should not be interpreted as causal but they reflect
empirical relationships. Prior research that could apply such techniques shows that the impact
of reverse causality on IT coefficient estimates is rather limited (Tambe and Hitt (2012)).
5.4 Robustness Checks for SMEs
To gauge the sensitivity of the results to the construction of the enterprise software use indi-
cator and the work organization variables, I conduct the productivity analysis as of Table 7
with differently constructed indicators and the individual software variables. Table 8 shows
the results for the specification with all control variables as in specification (7), Table 7. Col-
umn (1) presents the results when the dummy variables for self-responsible business unit and
performance pay are added in a count indicator for decentralized work organization and a cor-
responding interaction term between IT and this work organization indicator is included. The
coefficient on this work organization indicator is positively significant, whereas the interaction
term with IT is not statistically significant. In column (2) and (3), I include once the individu-
ally standardized software values and once the dummy variables for ERP, SCM and CRM that
are incorporated in the enterprise software indicator. In isolation, ERP with weak significance
and SCM raise productivity. This finding is similar to the productivity contributions of these
three systems for Korean firms where only SCM raises productivity significantly (Shin (2006)).
I also conducted the regressions with the individual software standardized and the binary values
including interaction terms between them and the two work organization variables (results are
not reported; available upon request). Among the interaction terms only the combination of
CRM with performance pay is weakly significant.
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Table 8: Productivity Regressions of IT and Work Organization for SMEs
- Different Measures
All Industries, Dependent Variable: log(Value Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IT - Index(ERP+CRM+SCM) 0.030 0.036
(0.019) (0.023)
IT - Index(ERP+CRM) 0.016
(0.018)
S(ERP) 0.022∗
(0.013)
ERP-Dummy 0.024
(0.027)
S(SCM) 0.029∗∗
(0.013)
SCM-Dummy 0.059∗∗
(0.025)
S(CRM) 0.003
(0.014)
CRM-Dummy 0.001
(0.027)
BU+PP 0.113∗∗∗
(0.018)
Self-responsible Business Unit (BU) 0.150∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Performance Pay (PP) 0.090∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Self-responsible team work (TEAM) -0.018
(0.025)
IT(ERP,SCM,CRM)*BU -0.022
(0.027)
IT(ERP,SCM,CRM)*PP 0.040
(0.025)
IT(ERP,SCM,CRM)*TEAM -0.018
(0.025)
IT(ERP, SCM, CRM)*(BU+PP) 0.012
(0.016)
IT(ERP,CRM)*BU -0.031
(0.026)
IT(ERP,CRM)*PP 0.042∗
(0.023)
log(Employment) 0.857∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗ 0.857∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
log(Capital Stock) 0.106∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
% Emp. Working with PC 0.543∗∗∗ 0.543∗∗∗ 0.550∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.542∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.063) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)
% High-Skilled Emp. 0.103 0.106 0.104 0.105 0.108
(0.083) (0.083) (0.083) (0.084) (0.084)
Exporting 0.125∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Works Council 0.122∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Change in Management 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.037 0.037
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Constant 9.223∗∗∗ 9.238∗∗∗ 9.183∗∗∗ 9.215∗∗∗ 9.244∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.146) (0.143) (0.145) (0.146)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 4493 4493 4493 4493 4487
Number of Firms 3292 3292 3292 3292 3288
R2 0.7469 0.7470 0.7468 0.7469 0.7466
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Control variables include industry dummy
variables based on two-digit classification interacted with a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy
variable for location equal to one if the firm is in one new German Bundesland (member state), i.e.
formerly East Germany, and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a multi-plant group. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses.
Since SCM is a special software that not all firms need, I only include ERP and CRM in
the enterprise software indicator (column (4)). As for the main indicator of IT intensity, the
combination of IT and performance pay is again weakly significant and the other coefficients
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do not change qualitatively. Finally, column (5) shows the results when a dummy variable
for the practice of self-responsible team work in the firm is considered, which has been used
in prior analyses to measure decentralization. This measure reflects the transfer of autonomy
to individuals and groups. In contrast to other evidence of a positive relationship between
group-based work organization variables and productivity (e.g. Bresnahan et al. (2002)), the
coefficient is statistically not significant from zero nor is the interaction term with IT. Moreover,
its inclusion does not change the other results qualitatively.
Overall, the conclusion from the different specifications how combinations of IT and decentralized
work organization are related to productivity is that SMEs with higher computer work intensity
and the use of decentralized work organization and performance pay are more productive. This
result remains robust considering also alternative sources of better performance, such as skill
composition or exporting. However, in general the results suggest that for my measures of IT
and work organization, their combination is not associated with higher productivity. There is
only some weak evidence that more IT-intensive firms, that also offer performance pay, are more
productive.
5.5 Results for Large Firms
Prior research finds evidence for complementarity between IT and decentralized work organiza-
tion for large firms, mainly from the US. This section illustrates the results using the sample
of large firms within the ICT panel, here classified as firms with more than 250 employees.
Overall, there are 598 such firms. The results from the correlation analysis reflect some differ-
ences in comparison to those from SMEs. While offering performance pay is correlated with
higher enterprise software use intensity, having a self-responsible business unit is not (Table 9).
Moreover, instead of the share of employees working mainly with the PC as another measure
for a firm’s IT intensity to be positively related to software use intensity, an increasing share of
high-skilled employees is related to more intensive software use. This finding is consistent with
complementarity between IT and human capital.
The results from the productivity analysis differ, too. As for the SMEs sample, without taking
account of possible interactions between IT and work organization, more intensive enterprise
software use raises productivity significantly. However, the productivity return to software is
almost twice larger than for SMEs (specification (3), Table 10 for large firms, specification (3);
Table 7 for SMEs). This finding suggests that larger firms seem to benefit more from enterprise
software than smaller firms. In contrast to the results from SMEs, decentralized work organiza-
tion does not increase productivity significantly for large firms. Given that the majority of firms
in the sample offers performance pay (mean = 85 percent) and also has self-responsible business
units (mean = 70 percent), it is plausible that these work organization practices do not explain
productivity differences significantly. Another central difference is that the combination of IT
and existence of a self-responsible business unit raises productivity significantly (specification
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Table 9: Correlations between IT and Work Organization for Large Firms
Dependent Variable IT - Index(ERP+CRM+SCM) IT - Index(ERP+CRM)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Self-Responsible Business Unit (BU) 0.079 0.042 0.021 -0.015
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Performance Pay (PP) 0.297∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.277∗∗
(0.113) (0.110) (0.108) (0.110)
log(Employment) 0.057 0.032 0.041 0.017 0.015 0.001
(0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
% Emp. Working with PC 0.277 0.272 0.268 0.254
(0.176) (0.176) (0.176) (0.180)
% High-Skilled Emp. 0.455∗ 0.481∗ 0.476∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.252) (0.250) (0.251) (0.241)
Exporting 0.254∗∗ 0.239∗∗ 0.238∗∗ 0.161
(0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.121)
Works Council -0.058 -0.059 -0.059 0.042
(0.135) (0.134) (0.134) (0.147)
Change in Management 0.221∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.073)
log(Capital Stock) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Constant -2.560∗∗∗ -2.848∗∗∗ -2.712∗∗∗ -2.981∗∗∗ -2.987∗∗∗ -2.613∗∗∗
(0.520) (0.514) (0.529) (0.519) (0.520) (0.526)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 767 767 767 767 767 767
Number of Firms 598 598 598 598 598 598
R2 0.0981 0.1230 0.1074 0.1307 0.1296 0.0841
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Control variables include industry dummy variables based on two-digit classification
interacted with a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy variable for location equal to one if the firm is in one new German Bundesland
(member state), i.e. formerly East Germany, and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a multi-plant group. Robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses.
5 to 7, Table 10). This positive interaction term is consistent with complementarity between
IT and decentralization. The productivity premium between IT and decentralized work organi-
zation is significant for the alternative IT and work organization indicators (specification 1, 4
and 5, Table 11), too. This result underlines that large firms which combine technology with
appropriate work organization perform particularly well, whereas work organization in isolation
does not explain productivity differences significantly. Given that the correlation between IT
and existence of a self-responsible business unit is not significant, the positive and significant
interaction term between IT and this organizational practice indicates that firms with a self-
responsible business unit, which also use enterprise software intensively, are more productive.
These opposing results from the correlation and productivity analysis with respect to the con-
clusion for complementarity underline the different statistical power properties of each method
for testing the existence of organizational complementarities.20
20See Section 4 for this argument.
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Table 10: Productivity Regressions of IT and Work Organization for Large Firms
All Industries, Dependent Variable: log(Value Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
IT - Index(ERP+CRM+SCM) 0.121∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.013 -0.010 0.107∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050) (0.025)
Self-Responsible Business Unit (BU) 0.060 0.066 0.053 0.060 0.047
(0.054) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Performance Pay (PP) -0.078 -0.056 -0.054 -0.053 -0.079
(0.067) (0.070) (0.071) (0.072) (0.068)
IT * BU 0.100∗∗ 0.094∗ 0.095∗
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
IT * PP 0.065 0.072 0.070
(0.054) (0.052) (0.052)
log(Employment) 0.849∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)
log(Capital Stock) 0.158∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
% Emp. Working with PC 0.308∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.297∗∗ 0.190 0.191
(0.121) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.121)
% High-Skilled Emp. 0.482∗∗∗ 0.570∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.178) (0.184)
Exporting 0.109 0.110 0.111
(0.080) (0.081) (0.081)
Works Council 0.158 0.164 0.164
(0.106) (0.108) (0.109)
Change in Management 0.013 0.017 0.015
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant 9.000∗∗∗ 9.305∗∗∗ 9.194∗∗∗ 9.226∗∗∗ 9.221∗∗∗ 9.049∗∗∗ 9.098∗∗∗ 9.050∗∗∗
(0.338) (0.336) (0.342) (0.348) (0.348) (0.352) (0.350) (0.353)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 767 767 767 767 767 767 767 767
Number of Firms 598 598 598 598 598 598 598 598
R2 0.6825 0.6930 0.6965 0.6968 0.6987 0.7035 0.7026 0.7017
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Control variables include industry dummy variables based on two-digit classification
interacted with a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy variable for location equal to one if the firm is in one new German Bundesland
(member state), i.e. formerly East Germany, and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a multi-plant group. Robust standard errors
clustered at the firm level in parentheses.
Another difference to the results from SMEs is that the share of employees working mainly at
the PC does not raise productivity significantly, whereas the share of high-skilled employees
does. This result might reflect that the majority of large firms has reached their optimal level
of PC-based employees so that differences in this share do not explain productivity differences
in contrast to different levels of skilled human capital employed by the firm.
The findings support prior evidence on complementarity between IT and decentralization which
has been found for rather large firms. The comparison of the results between smaller and larger
firms is compatible with the results in Tambe and Hitt (2012). They argue that large firms
derive larger productivity returns from IT than firms of smaller size, which is consistent with
advantages in economies of scale for larger firms. Moreover, the results from the productivity
analysis in this paper support their argument that large firms may have advantages in benefitting
from IT-related complements, such as decentralization. Nevertheless, the results can only be
interpreted as reflecting robust correlations and should not be viewed as causal. It might be
that the positive interaction term between IT and decentralization reflects the impact of an
unobservable factor that is correlated with both IT and decentralization, which is the true
relevant factor for improved productivity.
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Table 11: Productivity Regressions of IT and Work Organization for Large Firms
- Different Measures
All Industries, Dependent Variable: log(Value Added)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
IT - Index(ERP+CRM+SCM) -0.027 -0.010
(0.049) (0.050)
IT - Index(ERP+CRM) -0.022
(0.048)
S(ERP) 0.042
(0.027)
ERP-Dummy 0.163
(0.108)
S(SCM) 0.058∗∗
(0.025)
SCM-Dummy 0.113∗∗
(0.053)
S(CRM) 0.052∗∗
(0.026)
CRM-Dummy 0.080
(0.056)
BU+PP 0.013
(0.043)
Self-responsible Business Unit (BU) 0.048 0.038 0.056 0.051
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053)
Performance Pay (PP) -0.079 -0.072 -0.055 -0.047
(0.068) (0.068) (0.069) (0.072)
Self-responsible team work -0.013
(0.056)
IT(ERP,SCM,CRM)*BU 0.092∗
(0.049)
IT(ERP,SCM,CRM)*PP 0.071
(0.052)
IT(ERP, SCM, CRM)*(BU+PP) 0.089∗∗∗
(0.032)
IT(ERP,CRM)*BU 0.116∗∗
(0.051)
IT(ERP,CRM)*PP 0.042
(0.049)
log(Employment) 0.825∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗ 0.833∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.824∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
log(Capital Stock) 0.144∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
% Emp. Working with PC 0.195 0.189 0.194 0.200∗ 0.169
(0.120) (0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.119)
% High-Skilled Emp. 0.497∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.184) (0.185) (0.186) (0.183)
Exporting 0.107 0.110 0.110 0.119 0.104
(0.080) (0.082) (0.084) (0.081) (0.080)
Works Council 0.158 0.166 0.161 0.147 0.161
(0.106) (0.108) (0.110) (0.107) (0.106)
Change in Management 0.011 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.011
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Constant 9.021∗∗∗ 9.053∗∗∗ 8.703∗∗∗ 8.962∗∗∗ 9.061∗∗∗
(0.351) (0.354) (0.358) (0.351) (0.349)
Control Variables yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Observations 767 767 767 767 763
Number of Firms 598 598 598 598 595
R2 0.7037 0.7009 0.6982 0.7015 0.7040
Significance levels: ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Control variables include industry dummy
variables based on two-digit classification interacted with a full set of year fixed effects, a dummy
variable for location equal to one if the firm is in one new German Bundesland (member state), i.e.
formerly East Germany, and a dummy variable if the firm belongs to a multi-plant group. Robust
standard errors clustered at the firm level in parentheses.
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6 Conclusion
The goal of this paper has been to increase the knowledge about the relationship between IT
and decentralized work organization and their productivity contributions in small- and medium-
sized firms. I provide empirical evidence from correlation analyses between IT and decentralized
work organization and from productivity analyses of these two factors. Given that SMEs play
an important role for employment and the creation of economic value in Germany, examining
which factors contribute to productivity for firms of this size is relevant for policymakers to
understand determinants of the economy’s productivity performance. Moreover, I compare the
results for SMEs to those for larger firms. This comparison sheds light on whether and how
the productivity contributions of IT and decentralization differ between small and large firms.
Since empirical evidence on IT productivity in small firms is still scarce, the comparison allows
analyzing whether findings from large firms are valid for small firms, too.
My results show different productivity contributions from combining IT and decentralization
for SMEs and for large firms. For SMEs, the combination of IT and decentralized work is not
related to higher productivity. Contrarily, the results for large firms support prior evidence
of complementarity between IT and decentralization since the estimates for the interaction
between IT and decentralization are significantly positive. Thus, the productivity contribution
of IT depends on decentralization for large firms.
Given that there is few evidence on complementarity between IT and decentralization for SMEs,
my results cast doubt on whether productivity-enhancing interaction effects from IT and decen-
tralized work practices have ever been present for smaller firms. In small firms, coordination
issues between different subunits and the optimal use of information are probably on average
easier to handle than in large firms, regardless of their decentralization degree. Thus, small firms
might on average have lower demand for formal decentralization as they might benefit less from
it. Alternatively, they might be less adept than large firms to employ IT and accompany it with
complementary investments. These could be explanations why for SMEs the results do not show
that the productivity of IT depends positively on decentralized work organization like for large
firms. The comparison of results across firm size suggests that findings on IT returns from larger
firms cannot necessarily be generalized to smaller firms. Generally, more empirical evidence on
IT returns and the role of IT-related intangibles in SMEs, such as workplace reorganization or
IT training, would be helpful to better understand the impact of IT in smaller firms and to see
whether there are differences between small and large firms as it is found in this paper and by
recent research (e.g. Tambe and Hitt (2012)).
There are some limitations of the data used in this paper. Most importantly, I could only include
a small number of work organization practices, which capture only a small part of a firm’s work
organization. Nevertheless, the results reveal a robust positive relationship between productivity
and decentralized work organization in terms of self-responsible business units and performance
pay for SMEs. Thus, they underline the relevance of work organization for firm outcomes.
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Moreover, although I do not find a productivity premium between IT and decentralization
for SMEs, for them and for large firms, the results reveal positive productivity returns from
IT. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that firms which use IT to organize their
production and business processes are more productive. Even though the results do not afford
a causal interpretation, they provide evidence that SMEs with different levels of IT intensity
and decentralized work practices perform differently. Similarly, a recent survey by the Boston
Consulting Group (2013) stresses the existence of performance gaps between SME leaders and
laggards in IT adoption and use, and points towards the untapped economic potential that could
be unfolded if laggards adopted advanced IT and used it more effectively.
My findings raise questions about possible reasons for different levels of IT intensity and work
organization. Are there financial barriers preventing firms from investing more in IT? Or do
firms lack internal IT knowledge to implement advanced IT solutions? In light of an ongoing
digitization of economic processes and in a world of increasingly available data on the production
process, business partners and customers, which can be summarized by the term ’Big Data’,
using information as an input to the value creation process and to gain competitive advantage
will remain important for firm success. Future research should analyze which organizational
capabilities enable the most effective IT use. A better understanding why firms of similar size
use different IT levels and work organization structures and which barriers of adoption they face
could help policymakers designing supportive policy measures, for instance, by providing access
to facilitated funding or special IT training sessions for SMEs.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table 12: Industry distribution in full sample and the complete data set from 2004, 2007, 2010
for SMEs
Industry obs. % of sample obs. % of data set
Manufacturing Sector
Consumer goods 527 11.73 941 11.56
Chemical and pharmaceutical industry 221 4.92 425 5.22
Other raw materials 341 7.59 647 7.95
Metal industry 348 7.75 611 7.51
Electrical engineering 473 10.53 846 10.40
Machine construction 326 7.26 538 6.61
Vehicle construction 208 4.63 399 4.90
Service Sector
Retail trade 311 6.92 633 7.78
Wholesale trade 234 5.21 421 5.17
Transportation 320 7.12 617 7.58
Media services 156 3.47 250 3.07
IT and other information services 384 8.55 667 8.20
Business consultancy and advertising 142 3.16 253 3.11
Technical services 376 8.37 633 7.78
Other business services 126 2.80 256 3.15
Number of observations 4493 100 8137 100
Data source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010.
Table 13: Industry distribution in full sample and the complete data set from 2004, 2007, 2010
for Large Firms
Industry obs. % of sample obs. % of data set
Manufacturing Sector
Consumer goods 89 11.60 184 10.47
Chemical and pharmaceutical industry 36 4.69 111 6.38
Other raw materials 69 9.00 145 8.33
Metal industry 58 7.56 129 7.41
Electrical engineering 87 11.34 207 11.89
Machine construction 80 10.43 162 9.30
Vehicle construction 83 10.82 167 9.59
Service Sector
Retail trade 37 4.82 91 5.23
Wholesale trade 29 3.78 78 4.48
Transportation 60 7.82 142 8.16
Media services 28 3.65 63 3.62
IT and other information services 45 5.87 100 5.74
Business consultancy and advertising 14 1.83 33 1.90
Technical services 30 3.91 69 3.96
Other business services 22 2.87 60 3.45
Number of observations 767 100 1741 100
Data source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010.
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Table 14: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Enterprise Software Use for
Large Firms (Firms with more than 250 employees)
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. ERP SCM CRM
ERP 1.72 0.58 0 2 1
SCM 1.07 0.79 0 2 0.25 1
CRM 0.99 0.75 0 2 0.18 0.29 1
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N = 767.
Table 15: Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Work Organization Variables for
Large Firms
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Business Unit Performance Pay
Business Unit 0.70 0.46 0 1 1
Performance Pay 0.85 0.36 0 1 0.13 1
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N = 767.
Table 16: Production Function Variables for Large Firms
variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
Number of Employees 1 156 2 749 550 253 39355
Capital Stock 348 967 105 0.04 12 400
Total Sales 259 743 95 3.79 10 000
Value Added (deflated) 82.20 271 29.70 1.34 5 550
% Firms located in former East Germany 0.17 0.37 0 0 1
% Multi-Plant Group 0.72 0.45 1 0 1
Labour Productivity (Sales per Employee) 0.22 0.27 0.16 0.008 4.44
Value Added per Employee (deflated) 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.002 0.97
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N = 767.
The values of gross investment, sales, value added and the respective per capita values are
expressed in million Euros. Deflated Values are in prices of 2005.
Table 17: Means and Standard Deviations for further Firm Characteristics for Large Firms
variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
% Emp. Working with PC 0.41 0.27 0 1
% High-Skilled Emp. 0.19 0.20 0 1
% Share Exporters 0.74 0.44 0 1
% Works Council 0.89 0.32 0 1
% Change in Management 0.46 0.50 0 1
Data Source: ZEW ICT Panel 2004, 2007, 2010. N =767.
33
A.2 Data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany
I use information from the German National Accounts from 2012 ("Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamt-
rechnung 2012" Fachserie 18, Reihe 1.4) provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany
and published in September 2013 to construct a measure for real value added from total sales
that are available in the ICT survey and to deflate gross investment. For real value added,
I create a correction factor equal to the ratio of price-adjusted value added over the nominal
total production value in Euro by two-digit industry (WZ 2008 industry values) and year. The
year 2005 serves as the base year for the deflation of the nominal values. This correction factor
CFVA provides a measure for the yearly j average share of real value added in the nominal total
production value at the two-digit industry level j:
CFVAjt =
price-adjusted value addedjt
nominal total production valuejt
Then, I multiply firms’ total sales, where i indicates each firm, with this correction factor to
obtain an approximation for the firms’ real value added in the respective year. The following
equation summarizes the construction of real value added:
deflated value addedit = nominal salesit ∗ CFVAjt
To obtain deflated gross investment, I create similarly a correction factor CFINV that measures
the average share of price-adjusted gross investment over nominal gross investment at the year
and two-digit industry level. Then, I multiply firms’ yearly gross investment with this correction
factor. The calculations are formalized in the following two equations:
CFINVjt =
price-adjusted gross investmentjt
nominal gross investmentjt
deflated gross investmentit = nominal gross investmentit ∗ CFINVjt
If firms reported zero investment, in order to not lose these observations, I replace gross invest-
ment with the 10th percentile of gross investment per employee in the corresponding industry
multiplied by the firm’s number of employees. For some industries also the 10th percentile of
gross investment is zero so that in this case I use the 15th percentile value.
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A.3 Construction of the Capital Stock
The capital stock is based on the deflated gross investment (see above) and constructed using
the perpetual inventory method (PIM).21 The PIM specifies how to estimate an initial capital
stock value and the continuation values for the period of available information on investment.
According to the PIM, an initial capital stock value can be estimated by the following equation:
K1 =
I1
g + δ
where I1 stands for investment in the first period, g for the annual average growth rate of
investment and δ for the average depreciation rate of capital within the period of the available
data. In case of the ICT survey, the information on gross investment is at most available for
five periods, although for the majority of observations rather less times due to the unbalanced
panel structure. Instead of taking the initial investment data to compute an estimate of the
initial capital stock, I use the average investment level of the data points which are available in
order to minimize the influence of outliers on the estimate of the initial capital stock. Thus, the
formula for the initial capital stock becomes:
K1 =
mean(I)
g + δ
The average depreciation rate g is computed using the average industry-wide depreciation rate
from 1999 until 2009 provided by the National Accounts data. The time frame covers the time
period of the available ICT survey data. The growth rate of capital is set to the value 0.05 based
on Hall and Mairesse (1995).
The continuation values of the capital stock, that take account of yearly capital accumulation,
are specified as follows:
Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 + It
where t represents the time period. Since the ICT survey is constructed as an unbalanced
survey, the capital accumulation equation must be adjusted for the period differences between
the data points of the years that are available for each firm. For instance, a firm may only
have been surveyed in 2002 and 2010. Then, there is only information on investment for these
years. Consequently, the capital stock accumulation must consider the time lag of eight years
for the depreciation rate of capital and the growth rate of investment. These considerations are
summarized in the following formula:
21See e.g. Hall and Mairesse (1995) for an application of the PIM to construct a knowledge capital stock.
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Kt = (1− δ)t−nKn + In
t−n−1∑
s=1
(1− δ)t−n−s(1 + g)s + It
where n < t. For the example of data available only for 2002 and 2010, n is equal to 2002 and
t to 2010. This formula is obtained from recursive substitution of the last period’s available
capital accumulation equation.
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